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THE WASHINGTON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ACT: ITS
RESTRICTION ON ACCESS TO THE ELECTION PROCESS'
GORDON JAYNES

Since the time of the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, the national
and state governments have sporadically enacted legislation intended
to inhibit and punish activity subversive to existing government. Since
Jefferson's time, such legislation has had both impassioned advocates
and embittered opponents. It is the product of eras of political tension.'
Inherent in these laws is the danger that zealousness in the preservation
of the integrity of government may violate political rights guaranteed
by our constitutions. An examination of their constitutionality need
imply no judgment regarding the political wisdom of their enactment
nor the manner of their enforcement, and none is here intended.
The Washington Subversive Activities Act' states in section 16: "No
person shall become a candidate for election under the laws of the
'The title was suggested by an organizational division in EMERsoN

AND HA1DER,

(1952).
2 At the time the Act here considered was passed, the laws of Washington contained
statutes and constitutional provisions concerning treason and misprision of treason,
rebellion and insurrection, sedition, criminal anarchy, the use of red flags, sabotage, the
use of masks and disguises, teachers' oaths, and exclusion of certain persons from state
employment on the basis of subversive activity. In 1931 the legislature passed a criminal
syndicalism law, repealed in 1937. GEmHORN, THE STATES AND SUav- isoN (1952).
Under these laws, and particularly the criminal syndicalism law, many prosecutions
have ensued. Perhaps the most active period of appellate litigation on such prosecutions
was during 1921-22, when some twelve cases were before the Washington Supreme
Court. For an interesting account of these cases, and their relation to Washington
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

history, see: COUNTRYMAN, UN-AmE.cAN AcrivrnEs IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

(1952) ; HAWLEY AND POTTs, COUNSEL FOR THE DAmED (1953).

8 L. 1951, c. 254. The law is a governor's bill, promised in Message of Arthur B.
Langlie, Governor of Washington, to the Thirty-Second Legislature, January 10, 1951,
(House journal, p. 30) and introduced as Senate Bill No. 379, in the Thirty-Second
Regular Session (1951), by Senator Harold G. Kimball. Held not subject to referendum: State v. Meyer, 38 Wn2d 330, 229 P.2d 506 (1951).
The Governor's Message gives an indication of the purpose of the law: "To further
strengthen our civil defense program, we must 91so be mindful of that small group of
traitors within our citizenry who would destroy our freedom from within. In this connection, I strongly urge that the legislature give thought to enactment of appropriate
provisions for the curbing of subversive activity, and to protect our free institutions
from perversion into weapons of aggression against us in the hands of our enemies.
"By Concurrent Resolution No. 10, the Thirtieth Legislature created the Joint
Legislative Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities. Through the labors
of the committee much was learned of the degree to which disloyal groups had infiltrated
into organizations of our senior citizens, into various economic and educational groups.
As a result of these disclosures, some remedial action was taken but in the light of the
grave emergency which we now face, additional action must be taken immediately.
Therefore, a bill is being prepared calculated to give support at the state level to the
efforts of our various federal agencies charged with the responsibility of combating
these forces of tyranny and enslavement."
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state of Washington to any public office whatsoever in this state, unless
he or she shall file an affidavit that he or she is not a subversive person
as defined in this chapter. No declaration of candidacy shall be received for filing by any election official of any county or subdivision
in the state of Washington or by the secretary of state of the state of
Washington unless accompanied by the affidavit aforesaid, and there
shall not be entered upon any ballot or voting machine at any election
the name of any person who has failed or refused to make the affidavit
as set forth herein." Section I defines "subversive person" as "... any
person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission,
or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to
commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow,
destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government
of the United States, or of the state of Washington, or any political
subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who
is a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive
organization." The terms "subversive organization" and "foreign
subversive organization" are defined in the same section as any organization which engages in, or has as a purpose, any of the activity
proscribed in the quoted portion; and, any organization controlled
by a foreign government which engages in, or has as a purpose, any
of the activity proscribed.
The constitutionality of this requirement was challenged in Huntamer v. Coe,' a declaratory judgment action against the secretary of
state in his capacity as chief election officer of the state, seeking to
have sections 16 and I adjudged unconstitutional. Plaintiffs intended
to become candidates for governor, United State Congress, and the
state legislature. The secretary of state indicated that, in connection
with the filing of declarations of candidacy for those offices, the execution of the following would be required:
"Declaration and Affidavit of Candidacy" (For Partisan Offices)
"State of Washington1
] ss.
DECLARATION
"County of ........J
"I,
.......
........ , declare upon honor that I reside at
......
of County of .....................................
, State of Washington, and am a qualified voter
therein, and a member of the .......................Party; that I hereby declare myself
a candidate for nomination to the office of ..........................
to be made at the primary
election to be held on the . .. day of September, 19 ........
and hereby request that my
name be printed upon the official primary ballots, as provided by law, as a candidate of
4 40 Wn.2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952).
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the .................................... Party and I accompany herewith the sum of ........ Dollars, the
fee required by law of me for becoming such a candidate.
AFFIDAVIT
Further, I do solemnly swear that I have read the provisions of Section 1, Chapter
254, Laws of 1951, of the State of Washington, defining a subversive person as quoted
below; that I understand and I am familiar with the contents thereof; and that I am
not a subversive person as therein defined.
[printed name]
................................................................
SIGN H ERE ................................................
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ........ day of ................ 19 ........

o........
........
°........
................
°

[official]
o.:..........................................

The Washington Supreme Court, en banc and without dissent, reversed the decision of the trial court and adjudged the provision constitutional. The opinion of the court prompts this Comment.
The court, through Judge Finley, considered two questions: (1)
whether plaintiffs' case justified an adjudication under the declaratory
judgment act; (2) whether the chapter was unconstitutional in that
(a) it allegedly imposed an additional qualification for public office
in violation of the constitution, and (b) imposed a punishment on
particular candidates for past activity not previously considered
illegal. The first question was decided affirmatively.
In considering the second question, the court first examines the
history of oaths, quoting at length from the majority opinion in Imbrie
v. Marsh.' The court then states: "In view of the foregoing historical
aspects . . . our concern is whether or not the oath . . . constitutes
either (1) a restraint upon religious freedom, or (2) is ex post facto,
or in the nature of a bill of attainder.. ." The opinion continues: "We
can quickly and positively state that the statute in question imposes
no restraint upon religious freedom. Almost as quickly,, and just as
positively, we can state that the statute is not ex post facto, nor a bill
of attainder...." The latter statement the court makes on the basis
of their holding "... we think the statute.., can and should be inter5 3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d 352 (1950), an action by nominees for governor and members
of the state legislature seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that a state statute
requiring of all state officials an oath of office in addition to the provision of the state
constitution-"Every State officer, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall
take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State and
of the United States and to perform the duties of his office faithfully, impartially and
justly to the best of his ability.'--was unconstitutional. The oath in question included:
a statement that the affiant was not a member of, or affiliated with, any, organization
advocating force, or violence, "or other unconstitutional means" to overthrow the
governments; and a statement that affiant did not believe in, advocate or advise such
activity. Held: the oath was unconstitutional, in view of the exclusive nature of the
oath prescribed in the constitution. See Note, 18 A.L.R.2d 241 (1951).
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preted in a present and prospective sense in so far as the requirement
of an oath is concerned .... M
In determining whether the requirement of the oath "...
imposes
upon candidates ... qualifications in addition to those prescribed in

either the state or the United States constitutions," the court apparently
resolves the alleged conflict with the Washington Constitution by
finding chapter 254 ". . . consistent with the spirit and intent [of the
Constitution, and] ... in harmony with our way of life and our ideas

of the theory and practice of government in our country, as we see
and understand these things."
The alleged conflict with the United States Constitution is apparently
dismissed with the opinion that "The statute . . implements and is
in furtherance of Article VI, paragraph three . . ." thereof, which

provides: "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States." Here the court proceeds in a manner which can be described only as perplexing. Earlier
in its opinion, during the examination of the history of oaths the court
noted "Some considerable distinction . . . between (a) an oath of

office and (b) an oath of allegiance," and indicated the oath in question
was one of allegiance. Later, the court added

".

.

. it is extremely

difficult, if not downright impossible, for us to understand or see any
reason why any citizen aspiring to public office should object to the
kind of oath or affidavit of allegiance we think is required by... the
statute." (Italics supplied) Yet, the court refers to the oath as an
implementation of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which
6 In Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), the United States Supreme
Court considered the similar provision of the Maryland Subversive Activities Act, after
which the Washington law was patterned. The Court said "... . a candidate need only
make oath that he is not a person who is engaged in one way or another in the attempt
to overthrow the government by force or 'violence, and that he is not knowingly a
member of an organization engaged in such an attempt."
In the instant case, the Washington Court stated "We are in agreement with these
views . . ." thus implying the Washington oath need refer only to present activity
knowingly engaged in. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), decided five months
later, held that the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state
to exact an oath from its employees negativing membership in any subversive organization regardless of the employee's knowledge of the nature of the organization. In
1953, the Washington legislature amended the definition of "subversive person" accordingly. See Sholley, Criminal Law, 28 WASH. L. Ray. 175 (1953).
The court's construction so as to render the act constitutional if possible is based on
the routine canon. See Casco Co. v. P.U.D. No. 1, 37 Wn.2d 777, 226 P.2d 235 (1951).
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means, necessarily, the oath is one of office. The court evidently
realized this, as it stated ".... the oath required... is of no important
The time
respects different from the oath required by Article VI....
for taking [it] is merely advanced . . . to the time a candidate files
and declares his candidacy, and the oath is required of all candidatesthose ultimately successful, as well as those ultimately unsuccessful."
The court's analysis, in effect, makes the oath part of an oath of
office, administered before election, to all candidates. It is respectfully
submitted that this is an analytic confusion.7 An oath of office is one
administered as a prerequisite to full investiture with the office and is
in effect a formal acceptance of the office. 8 As will be indicated subsequently, this distinction should be considered as essential in determining the constitutionality of the oath in question.
The opinion deals with only one further constitutional point: ".
plaintiffs can have no possible logical convincing objection to [the
oath provision], unless it is the devious, deceiving, and transparently
dishonest claim that they have a right, as candidates, to be disloyal
during the time elapsing between the date declarations of candidacy
must be filed and the date of assuming office as a successful and elected
candidate.... Any claim of (such right] ... we are convinced, must
be characterized as de tninimis, and is hardly worthy of consideration
in a constitutional sense." An examination of the rest of the opinion
and the briefs of appellant, respondent, and amicus curiae does not
yield any indication to what "right" the court here refers. Certainly
no part of either constitution speaks of any "right to be disloyal."
The court's final "constitutional" point, then, seems rather a statement
of opinion than the examination of any legal issue.
In considering the second of the two questions dealt with in its
opinion-whether the chapter was unconstitutional-it is respectfully
suggested that the court's analysis of the chapter's imposition of an
additional qualification for public office is incomplete, and that the
court erred in believing that it had "1... meticulously observed, guarded,
and protected . . . [the plaintiffs'] stoutly-maintained constitutional

rights ....

"

Because rights relating to the election process are central to liberty
under republican government, and because the Washington Subversive
Activities Act is still a vital law, a detailed examination of the consti7
The confusion evidently was caused by a misreading of Justice Oliphant's extensive
discussion
of Article VI, in his dissent in Imbrie v. Marsh, note 5 supra.
8
Murphy v. Freeholders of Hudson, 91 N.J.L. 40, 102 At. 896 (1918).
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tutionality of its restriction on access to the election process is justified. 9
This examination will consider the restriction first as an oath of office
and second as an additional qualification for office.
National Office: If it were an oath of national office, it would conflict
with provisions of the United States Constitution. 0 Article VI, paragraph 3, quoted above, requires of all legislators, state and national,
and all executive and judicial officers, state and national, an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States. This paragraph was
implemented by the first statute enacted by Congress," setting out
the exact form to be used in administering the required oath: "I, A.B.,
do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support
the Constitution of the United States."1 2 The form required of national
officers has been altered subsequently by Congress, at various times.'
Also, Article II, Section 1, indicates the oath required of the President:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." It follows from Article VI, paragraph 2, that no state possesses
the requisite sovereignty to alter the form of either the oath prescribed
by Congress in pursuance of Article VI, paragraph 3, or the oath for
the President set out in the Constitution."
State Office: Were it an oath of state office, it would conflict with
provisions of both constitutions. Article VI, paragraph 3, of the United
States Constitution, quoted above, extends to all state officers, and the
form of the oath of office required of them, also quoted above, has
" As to the Act's vitality, see note 6 supra. Laws excluding certain persons from
elective office or from candidacy for elective offices were in existence in eleven states
and territories, as of January 1, 1951. GELLHORN, op. Cit. note 2 supra.
It is of interest to note that Washington's first statute requiring filing of declarations of candidacy was L. 1907, c. 209 (Primary Election Law). The 1915 legislature
passed c. 52, which required, among other things, that candidates swear in their declarations that they were eligible to the office to which they aspired. The act was vetoed by
a popular referendum in 1916, and the old form of declaration, contained in L. 1907, c.
209, restored, in which the candidate was not required to certify to his eligibility, under
oath or otherwise, nor is he now required to do so. See State v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 1,
81 P.2d 860 (1938).
20 In the instant case, the court held the chapter applicable to the plaintiff who
sought candidacy for the United States Congress. Although no other national office
was before the court, their interpretation of section 16 would seem to make the law
applicable to any national officer elected by state machinery. For a similar interpretation
of "state" office, see State v. Howell, 92 Wash. 381, 159 Pac. 118 (1916).
11 1 Stat. 23 (1789).
12 Ibid.
'1 See dissent, Imbrie v. Marsh, note 4 supra, 71 A.2d at 364 et seq.
'4 "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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remained unchanged. 5 Article VI, paragraph 2, then, requires that the
provisions of any state oath of office which relate to support of the
Constitution of the United States be in the prescribed form. Article
6, Section 28, of the Washington Constitution requires: "Every judge
of the supreme court, and every judge of a superior court shall, before
entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath that
he will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Washington, and will faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of judge to the best of his ability, which oath shall
be filed in the office of the secretary of state." The oath in question
would conflict with this Section." As to all other state officers, no
state oaths of office being prescribed by the state constitution, the
legislature may not alter by statute the constitutional qualifications for
those offices by making what is de facto an additional qualificationthe taking of an oath of office.""
But the oath here -in question is not properly termed an oath of
office. It is an additional qualification for candidacy to office. This
was recognized by the New Jersey court in Imbrie v. Marsh, even by
the dissent."' The similar provision of the Maryland Subversive
Activities Act was denominated an additional qualification for office
by both the majority and the minority opinions in Shub v. Simpson."
Logic would suggest that 'since those who do not swear the oath in
question cannot become candidates, it is therefore an additional qualification for candidacy." The problem then becomes whether the legislature has the power to prescribe this additional qualification for
candidacy.
15 4 U.S.C. 101.
18 Note 14 .suPra. Article VI, paragraph 3, was not considered by the court in
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, note 6 srupra.
17 See Imbrie v Marsh, note 5 sufra.

isIbid., 71 A.2d at 356. If the Washington Constitution required an oath of office
of all officers; similar in form to that required of judges, the same reasoning as to
the oath for judges would apply. Since even formal variation of constitutionality required oaths is invalid, no examination is made in this Comment concerning the possible
substantive variation between the contents of the oath required by the Act and the
contents of customary oaths of support to state constitutions.
20 Justice Oliphant, dissenting, stated that the oath ". . . does in effect require the
candidate to make open profession of his allegiance... .' 71 A.2d at 376.
20 196 Md. 177, 76 A2d 332; motion to expedite appeal denied, 340 U.S. 861; appeal

dismissed, 340 US. 881 (1950). Plaintiffs brought proceeding for writ of mandamus
directing the secretary of state to accept certificates of their nominations as candidates
for offices of governor, Representative, and Senator, without the filing of affidavits
required by the Maryland Act. Hold: the qualification for candidaecis inapplicable to
those seeking national office, applicable to those seeking state offie Cin view of a
,revious amendment to the state constitution).
21 See justice Carter's dissent in Pockmnan v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267
:1952).
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National Office: It has been suggested that because the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, while they prohibit certain discrimination
regarding suffrage, do not prohibit such discrimination regarding public
office and it may therefore be implied that states have the power to
add qualifications for national offices.2 2 Authoritative analysis rebuts
this: Hamilton said "The qualifications of persons who may choose, or
be chosen ... are defined and fixed in the Constitution and are unalterable by the legislature."" Story points out that under the Tenth
Amendment, "No powers could be reserved in the States except those
which existed in the States prior to the adoption of the Constitution."
A Senator or a Representative, he states "... is an officer of the Union,
deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution and
neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by the States." 2'
Previously, the Washington Court has accepted this analysis," and
it did not explicitly overrule the position in the Huntamer opinion. In
Shub v. Simpson,2 both the majority and the dissent agreed that the
provisions of the Maryland law were inapplicable to candidates for
national office. The majority opinion cites a full list of authorities to
support its holdings, but perhaps the dissent states the conclusion
more forcefully: "The State of Maryland has no more authority tc
prescribe qualifications for a member of Congress than for the Primf
Minister of Canada or Russia." '
It follows that the prescription in question here conflicts with Articl
I, Sections 2 and 3; and Article II, Section 1, which state the qualif
cations for Congressmen and the President and Vice President, and'
superseded by those provisions through the operation of the secor
paragraph of Article VI of the United States Constitution."
22

1949 Wis. L. RaV. 303.

No. 60.
of qualifications for national offices-see Article I, Sectit
phrasing
The negative
2 and 3 and Article II, Section 1, Constitution of the United States-does not im
413,
a power in the states to add qualifications. People v. McCormick, 261, Ill.
N.E. 1053 (1914).
28

TnE

FEDERALIST,

24 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

640 (5th ed.). It is appropriatf

note here that the oath required by the Act involves a statement of allegiance to
state government-something not necessarily required of national officers.
25 State v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 Pac. 569 (1918). Presumably, were the c
shown the oath in question is an attempted prescription of an additional qualific2
for candidacy for national office, it would abide by this decision.
26 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332.
27 Ibid., 76 A.2d at 340, 341.
28 Ibid, 76 A.2d at 345.
2

Note 14 supra.
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State Office: The Washington Court, in the Huntamer caie, said:
"The language of [Section 16] . .. is directed to the operation and
functioning of the election machinery in the State of Washington."
Presumbably, the Court accepted the contention of appellant in his
brief that the section was designed to protect the electorate from
"fraud." This, in turn, is probably a contention derived from a reading
of the dissent in Imbrie v. Marsh, where Justice Oliphant stated: "[The
New Jersey law in question] aims to prevent a fraud on the electorate
...I'll However, regardless of the aim of the Washington oath, if its
administration violates the constitutions, it is invalid.
The Washington Constitution sets out the qualifications for state
public offices in: Article 2, Sections 7 and 14, legislators; Article 3,
Section 25, all state executive offices; Article 4, Sections 15, 17, the
judiciary; Article 6, Sections 3 and 5, and Amendment 5, set out the
requirements of electors. No state oath of office is prescribed by the
Constitution for any state officer, except a judge. (Article 4, Section 28,
quoted above)"1 As indicated by Imbrie v. Marsh, and the authorities
cited therein, 2 it is an elementary principle of constitutional law that
the legislature cannot add, directly or indirectly, to the constitutional
qualifications of an officer; therefore, the prescription in question here
violates the above Sections of the Washington Constitution.
It was further contended in the briefs of respondent and amicus
curiae that the section under consideration violated Article 1, Section
10, of the Washington Constitution: "All elections shall be free and
equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to
prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." No Washington
cases were discovered litigating the full meaning of this Section, 8 but
it is suggested that the oath required by section 16, as analyzed above,
prevents equal access to candidacy by all constitutionally qualified
citizens, and thereby prevents equality of elections and prevents the
free exercises of the right of suffrage."
30 Note 5 supra, 71 A.2d at 376. This concept of "fraud" is somewhat novel as compared to the usual view of what constitutes fraud in an election. See "Elections," 18
Am. Jun. cc. XII, XIII.
31 Perhaps the Washington Constitution should be amended to provide an oath of
office for non-judicial officers. However, Amendment 8 and RCW 29.82 provide for
recall of all non-judicial elective officers.
32 Note 20 supra, 76 A.2d at 356.
33 The Section has been incidentally involved in several cases: e.g., State v. Nichols,
50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728 (1908), Carstens v. P.U.D. No. 1, 8 Wn.2d 136, 11-1 P.2d
583 (1941).
36 People v. McCormick, note 23 supfr.
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On the basis of the analysis presented in this Comment, it is contended that the Washington Subversive Activities Act imposes an
additional qualification for candidacy to public office in violation of the
constitutions and section 16 of the Act is therefore invalid. 5

35 It should be noted that there is authority that subsections 4 (2) and 4 (3) of the
Act are inoperative as to national office candidates and national electors.
The subsections provide: "Any person who shall be convicted or shall plead guilty
of violating any of the provisions [of the Act], in addition to all other penalties therein
provided, shall from the date of such conviction be barred from . . . (2) Filing or
standing for election to any public office in the state of Washington; or (3) Voting in
any election held in this state."
Using the interpretation indicated in note 10 supra, it is possible to read section 4
as applying to candidacy for national office, and to voting in state-conducted national
elections. Such an application would be erroneous. State v. Schmahl, 140 Minn, 219,
167 N.W. 481 (1918), State v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942). Also, see
E ParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1883).

